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1  Introduction 
 
One can attribute Russia’s dismal economic performance in the 1990s to many causes, but 
poor institutions and cumbersome bureaucracy are increasingly mentioned among the main 
culprits. The transition of the public sector from a Soviet-era producer and regulator to a 
market-supporting institution clearly has not succeeded − it is even questionable whether 
this goal was ever seriously targeted during the 1990s. The Russian government – espe-
cially at regional and local levels – is often described as a “grabbing hand” a phrase coined 
by Frye in Shleifer (1997). Many Soviet-era practices continue and politics still have con-
siderable influence on economic activities. Regional politicians and large firms may col-
lude to, e.g., avoid bankruptcies or optimise tax payments. Small and medium-sized enter-
prises together with foreign-owned companies, in contrast, tend to rate tax administration, 
government regulations and inspections as their major headaches. 
Although there are signs that administrative reform and cutting down bureaucracy 
are finally on the way, the reforms are far from completed (CEFIR 2005). Businesses con-
tinuously need close contacts with regional and local governments to alleviate their regula-
tory burden. One area of close cooperation between enterprises (especially large and me-
dium-sized ones) and the local public sector is the provision of public infrastructure.  
Based on unique data from a firm survey carried out in 2003 covering 404 large and 
medium-sized enterprises in 40 Russian regions, this paper aims to deepen our knowledge 
of the relationship between firms and the public sector at the local level (Haaparanta et al 
2003). We will concentrate on the causes and consequences of infrastructure provision, as 
proxied by heat production, for this relationship. It is increasingly acknowledged that well-
functioning public infrastructure is important for growth and development in its own right. 
This is especially true in a country as large and sparsely populated as Russia. We believe 
that the repair and maintenance of the basic infrastructure networks like roads as well as 
oil, gas and water pipelines is bound to become a major issue if economic growth is to con-
tinue in Russia.   
The role of poor infrastructure and deficient public services has, indeed, lately re-
ceived more attention in the economic literature. This is largely due to increased interest in 
structural reforms and infrastructure delivery in developing countries. The World Bank, 
especially, has been active in promoting discussion on infrastructure development and the Laura Solanko   Coping with missing public infrastructure:   
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role of infrastructure in promoting economic growth and welfare (World Bank 2002, 2004, 
EBRD 2004). Infrastructure, especially the provision of basic services and access to mod-
ern technology, is increasingly seen as an integral part of development. Most studies of 
cross-county growth do include infrastructure indicators in the analysis and many find 
them significant (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). The existing empirical evidence, how-
ever, indicates that the effect of public spending and investment on growth is mixed at 
best. This may be due to difficulties in measurement and identification: more spending 
does not necessarily turn into more public capital or services of uniform quality. This con-
cern has caused increased interest in micro-level studies that are better equipped to cope 
with these issues. Reinikka and Svensson (2002) do, in fact, show that poor public infra-
structure, as proxied by unreliable and inadequate electricity supply, significantly reduces 
private investment.    
As much of the development literature focuses on countries situated in much milder 
climatic conditions, heating has not received much, if any, attention in recent literature on 
infrastructure and development. Heating is, however, a necessary precondition for indus-
trial activities anywhere, especially anywhere north of latitude 50
o. Our survey data reveals 
that in 2002 three quarters of the large and medium-sized Russian enterprises produced 
their own heating. Of those, over half also provided district heating for users outside their 
plant area. District heating is, therefore, the area where the engagement of the enterprise 
sector in infrastructure provision is clearly most widespread. Further, based on the survey 
results, we know that heat-producing enterprises are, on average, more likely to give sup-
port for the maintenance of many other types of public infrastructure like roads, railways 
and hot steam pipelines. Therefore, we believe that engagement in district heating produc-
tion can be used as a meaningful proxy of engagement in infrastructure provision at large 
in Russia.  
The data offers us a unique opportunity to examine the relations between heat-
producing enterprises and the local public sector along many dimensions. As only less than 
40% of the enterprise managers named profit generation as a reason for heat deliveries, it 
seems natural to enquire more deeply into the determinants first, of heat production and 
second, of heat delivery. We will analyse here the effects of heat production on firm per-
formance to find an answer to the critically important question of whether engagement in 
public infrastructure service provision is a burden for the enterprise sector. Two conflicting 
hypotheses are possible. H1: Enterprises that are, due to historical reasons, forced into op-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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erations far beyond their main business suffer in terms of productivity and investments. 
H2: The enterprises that engage in heat and infrastructure provision do so in exchange for 
favours from the local government. Our conclusions seem to be much more in line with the 
latter option. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the following section discusses pub-
lic-private relations in Russia and characterises the general framework of the analysis. Sec-
tion three describes the data used. Section four presents the empirical results and section 
five concludes the discussion. 
 
 
2  Enterprises, district heating and the public sector  
in Russia  
 
Following Reinikka and Svensson (2002), complementary capital may be defined as capi-
tal that provides support services necessary for the operation of productive private capital. 
Especially in low- and medium-income countries, complementary capital (e.g. transport 
infrastructure or utilities) is typically provided by state monopolies or publicly owned 
companies. To a certain degree, a firm can substitute for mediocre public services by in-
vesting privately in complementary capital (e.g. private electric power generators). Heating 
is undoubtedly an integral component of complementary capital. In most parts of Scandi-
navia, Russia and a number of other countries of the former Soviet Union, heating is per-
ceived as a sort of semi-public good. The reason is that these countries have historically 
relied heavily on district heating, usually provided by municipal heat and power plants.  
In Russia, the engagement of enterprises in infrastructure provision has its roots in 
the way Soviet cities were planned. A standardized model of Soviet municipal infrastruc-
ture whereby a city of a certain size is linked to a certain number of electric power and 
heating plants emerged as a by-product of central planning. In fact, most of the classical 
social infrastructure items like heating utilities, housing, schools, hospitals, water and sani-
tation were designed on a district-wide or city-wide basis. The heating and power plants as 
well as the other infrastructure items would be operated either by the city or by individual 
enterprises according to the plan. (Hill and Gaddy 2003)   
Even today large enterprises remain critically important in some areas of infrastruc-
ture provision, notably in district heating. In many cases an enterprise continues to be the Laura Solanko   Coping with missing public infrastructure:   
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monopoly heat provider for the apartment blocks it owned or for a whole district. As an 
example, at the beginning of the heating period 2004 - 2005, the main concern of the city 
of Petrozavodsk (Republic of Carelia) was to ensure that two large companies currently in 
financial difficulties – the Avangard shipyard and the tractor factory Onega – would be 
ready for the heating season (Karjalan Sanomat, September 2004).   
There are two separate reasons for the private enterprises to engage in the produc-
tion of complementary capital (heating) in Russia. First, some firms have been forced to 
invest in their own boilers to substitute for or to complement the low-quality municipal dis-
trict heating. It is widely known that the district heating pipelines are in a sad state, charac-
terized by frequent leakages and considerable thermal losses. News about interruptions in 
heat delivery due to broken pipes or even a lack of fuel is not uncommon. At least in the-
ory, combined heat and power (CHP) generation is the most efficient method of district 
heat production. Thus, apart from the enterprises where steam or hot water is a by-product 
of the production process, investing in enterprises' own heat-only-boilers may cause an ef-
ficiency loss compared to a situation where the enterprise could rely on heating produced 
by a (municipal) CHP plant. 
Secondly, as noted above, enterprises sometimes are, by design, themselves respon-
sible for providing district heating for their surroundings. This unavoidably leads to a 
somewhat special relationship between the enterprises providing district heating and the 
local administration. The consumer price for heat is determined by regional energy com-
missions and municipalities. In most cases the tariffs have not been sufficient to cover the 
costs of supply and consequently heat supply has not been profitable even for the local en-
ergy companies running combined heat and power generation. (IEA 2002) Thus, it has 
been argued that the implicit obligation to provide heat for municipal district heating is an 
excessive burden for industrial enterprises struggling for their survival in the emerging 
market environment.  
On the other hand, there is (casual) evidence of cases where enterprises use their 
boilers as a bargaining tool vis à vis the local administration (interview with Starodu-
brovskaya in Moscow 2002). As our survey results show, heat-providing enterprises are on 
average larger and older than the enterprises not producing heat. And, especially in a tran-
sition economy, size tends to come with connections and influence.
2 An influential firm 
                                                 
2 This is naturally true for any economy, especially so if the legislative framework is in a state of flux and 
corruption is widespread.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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would typically be a large firm, employing a large share of the local population and conse-
quently affecting directly the local wellbeing and electoral mood (e.g. Hellman et al. 
2003).   
An influential firm has good opportunities to engage in what Frye (2002) describes 
as elite exchange. That is, enterprises which receive favourable treatment also provide 
some benefits to state agents. It is highly probable that at least some heat-providing firms 
have been able to negotiate with the local government for favours to compensate for the 
costs of heat production. This would, in fact, suggest that the enterprises have simply 
adapted to the existing institutions and infrastructure. The Soviet legacy of firms providing 
complementary capital not only for themselves may seem strange to an outside observer. 
But if firms have found their way around the local administration, infrastructure provision 
may not be any great obstacle to growth. Indeed, as pointed out by Rodrik (2003), a vide 
variety of even fairly unorthodox institutional setups may be compatible with economic 
growth.
3 
There are several possible reasons for the public sector to be interested in coopera-
tion with enterprises in the provision of public goods and complementary capital. The self-
evident reason naturally is that the local public sector in Russia has very little funds avail-
able for new investments and it is thus in everyone's interest to use the existing capacities 
whenever possible. Even if a municipality could manage public infrastructure without the 
help of the local enterprises, retaining the close relations probably provides local politi-
cians with various possibilities for collecting some private benefits.  
The mismatch between considerable expenditure requirements and the lack of own 
revenues at the regional level also results in peculiar forms of public goods provision. In 
their analysis of Russian fiscal federalism, Lavrov, Litwack, and Sutherland (2000) argue 
that regions and localities in Russia favour large incumbent firms capable of providing 
public goods. As cash-constrained regional and local governments must provide classic 
public goods such as education and health care as well as heating and road upkeep, local 
administrations have an incentive to cooperate with local enterprises in providing statutory 
public services. 
One channel for informal budget operations is where large firms contribute directly 
to the provision of some public services such as road maintenance or health care. In ex-
change, regional governments may tolerate large tax arrears with no expectation of ever Laura Solanko   Coping with missing public infrastructure:   
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being paid.
4 At the regional level, everyone is happy; firms roughly pay in some form most 
of the taxes they would otherwise have to pay, consumers get some public services, and 
regional leaders have independent discretion over budget operations. The obvious loser 
here is the federal government, which is effectively deprived of its share of tax revenue. 
(See also Haaparanta-Juurikkala 2004.) Frye (2002) does, indeed, offer survey evidence 
that the economic playing field in Russia is tilted in favour of large (formerly state-owned) 
enterprises and against smaller de novo firms, especially at the regional level. 
 
 
3  Data  
 
3.1  Data sources 
 
Most of the data used in this paper comes from a firm survey conducted among large Rus-
sian industrial enterprises in April-June 2003. The survey focused on enterprises' role in 
providing social services and infrastructure. The survey, therefore, included many ques-
tions on firm involvement in the provision of a wide variety of social services, as well as 
assessments of public infrastructure items, the generation of heat and electricity as well as 
regulation and competition. In contrast, detailed balance sheet data was not collected.  
The survey covered 404 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises in 40 regions 
in Russia. Apart from energy production and minerals extraction, which were excluded, the 
sample is representative of industrial distribution (on a 2-digit level) in Russia. The major-
ity of firms in the sample employ between 500 and 5000 employees. For a thorough dis-
cussion of the survey design and implementation, see Haaparanta et al (2003).  
 
3.2  The two dependent variables 
 
The general managerof each firm surveyed was asked if his enterprise currently produces 
heat and if heating is provided to outside users. Three quarters of the enterprises surveyed 
                                                                                                                                                    
3 See also Hausman et al (2004). 
4 Tax collection is the duty of the Federal Tax Ministry, but local tax offices have considerable power in im-
plementing tax rules as supervision and guidance from the higher-level tax administration have been rather 
weak. Employees of regional and local branches of the tax ministry often depend on regional or local gov-
ernments for their premises, transportation, communications, office equipment, etc. This creates an informal 
system of dual subordination that may allow regional and local governments to influence decision-making by 
local tax offices. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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produced heating in 2003. Of those who produced heating, over half also provided heating 
to outside users, mainly to the local housing and utilities sector (predprijatii zhilizno-
kommulnalnavo hozjaistva). There are no trading houses in the sample, i.e. no enterprise 
provides heating to outsiders if it does not produce heat. The general managers' answers, 
reported in Table 1 below, are used to construct two discrete dependent variables, one for 
heat production (heatprod) and another for district heat provision (heatsell). 
 
Table 1  Production and provision of heating 
   Firm owns heat-
ing boilers 
Firm produces heat 
(heatprod) 
Firm provides heat to 
outsiders (heatsell) 
Yes   306  300  167 
No   98  104  130 
Note: Due to missing responses, the sum of responses is sometimes less than the total number of firms in the sample. 
 
The general manager was also asked about the reasons for a firm's own production of heat-
ing and the reasons for providing district heating to outside users. The answers seem to re-
flect the fact that in most cases a firm's heat-producing capacity (i.e. boilers) was inherited 
from the socialist period. The majority of managers failed to name a reason for heat pro-
duction apart from "history" or "technological needs". Out of the 167 firms providing dis-
trict heating, only 69 considered it to be profitable. This result notwithstanding, the large 
majority did not wish to get rid of their heat-generating capacity. Therefore we intend to 
enquire deeper into the determinants of district heat provision.  
 
 
3.3  The main independent variables 
 
First and foremost a set of basic enterprise-level controls are used. We control for firm 
size, industrial branch, ownership and size of the municipality. To control for enterprise 
size, data on employment in 2002 is used, since employment data is always reported and is 
less prone to irregular reporting than sales or other accounting measures. The 2-digit level 
industry classification is used to construct dummies for the 9 main industries in the Russian 
classification. The number of inhabitants of the locality was obtained from the CEFIR mu-
nicipal database. In the empirical analysis, the log of the population as well as the log of 
employment is used in order to smooth the distribution. Laura Solanko   Coping with missing public infrastructure:   
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  In the survey, the general manager was asked about the detailed ownership struc-
ture of the firm. Given the generally low transparency and unwillingness to reveal the 
firm's owners, the response rate to this question was quite high: more than three quarters of 
firms provided information on their owners. A series of dummies on the largest share-
holder (insiders, private, state, foreign, other) was constructed. The category "insiders" in-
cludes employers and managers and the category private includes both private individuals 
and private Russian companies. The category state includes all three levels of government 
in Russia. The data confirms observations on the increased concentration of industry own-
ership in Russia. Of the 342 firms for which we have ownership data, in only 31 cases did 
no single shareholder group own the absolute majority (over 50% of the shares). Further, in 
only six firms were two ownership groups in control of equal amounts of shares. Large 
Russian firms do seem to be controlled by one type of owner.   
The survey provides us with data on whether the enterprise had boilers before 1990. 
Given the a priori assumption that history and inheritance play a large role in infrastructure 
services in Russia, one easily assumes that a dummy variable indicating if the firm had 
boilers before 1990 is a powerful determinant of heating production also today. Given that 
housing entities still comprise the largest customers of the district heating produced within 
firms, one could suppose that enterprises which had housing on their books in 1990 are 
likely to provide district heating even today. Consequently, a dummy indicating whether 
the enterprise had housing in 1990 is included.  
The main variables of interest include a set of variables on regulation and govern-
ment support as well as on the business environment. It is also possible that heat producers 
have tighter relations with the state along many dimensions. Each of the top managers in-
terviewed was asked how many working days they personally spent on dealing with vari-
ous regulative agencies.
5 This allows one to use a variety of different variables measuring 
the regulatory burden a firm faces. The variable used in the analysis is the time spent per-
sonally by the general manager in dealing with various licensing, certification and inspec-
tion agencies, with customs as well as with the local officials dealing with matters regard-
ing the use of public infrastructure. Further, the survey asked if the enterprise had received 
credits, tax breaks, engaged in restructuring tax debts, or had received subsidies or other 
forms of support from the state budget during the last three years (2000-2002). This is used 
                                                 
5 Partly due to the formulation of the questions managers sometimes cite amounts exeeding 250 working days 
per annum. In these cases the answers are coded as 250. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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to define a dummy variable that takes the value one if the enterprise received any form of 
budget assistance. The hypothesis is that firms engaged in heat production and district heat 
provision to outside users are more likely to receive budget assistance (especially so if heat 
deliveries are not profitable).   
Further, we asked if the firm gives voluntary financial or non-financial support, i.e. 
makes payments on top of compulsory taxes and fees, for the construction or maintenance 
of certain items of public infrastructure. The results are reported in Table 2 below. A 
dummy variable indicating if the enterprise gave support to any of the infrastructure items 
(infrasup) has been constructed.  
 
 



























Yes    67 48 34  70 62 97 31 173 
No    336 356 369  334 341 306 372 231 
  
Finally, the sample includes subjective assessment by the chief engineer on the quality of 
the outside-provided infrastructure. An unweighted average of the assessments is used to 
proxy for the quality of the surrounding infrastructure (infa_assess) (1-good, 2-satisfactory, 
3-poor). One could reasonably assume that the enterprises that estimate the quality of out-
side-provided services as being poor are more prone to producing some infra items within 
the plant. We also have data on the proportion of state sales in total sales in three consecu-
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4  Empirical results 
 
4.1  Heat production 
 
Having first a look at the descriptive statistics in Table 3, it seems clear that firm size, as 
measured by total employment, has good chances of being significant in explaining the 
probability that an enterprise produces heat within the plant. Also the size of the locality 
where the enterprise is located should indeed matter for heat production.  
 
 
Table 3  Employment, population and heat production. 
  heatprod =0  heatprod =1  P>t  N.obs 
mean of employment  1329  1817  0.20  402 
mean of city population  1 528 119  1 138 803  0.16  401 
Note: the p-value refers to the t-test on the equality of means, corrected for unequal variances. 
 
It is assumed that the probability of a firm producing heat (heatprodi) is dependent on sets 
of enterprise characteristics, inheritance controls, relations with the public sector and the 
normally distributed error term. The analysis is based on standard probit regression using 
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Table 4   Probit results for heat production 
  












Lnemployment 0.039  0.041 0.038 0.037 0.040 
  (2.50)**  (2.79)*** (2.58)*** (2.70)*** (2.77)*** 
Lnpopulation  -0.022 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 -0.016 
 (2.21)**  (1.44)  (1.65)*  (2.12)**  (1.86)* 
Boilers90  0.579 0.563 0.598 0.590 0.595 
  (13.14)*** (11.66)*** (14.73)*** (14.45)*** (14.91)*** 
Housing90 0.005  0.019  -0.011     
  (0.14) (0.54) (0.34)    
Est.year 0.001  0.001  -0.001     
  (0.30) (0.23) (0.30)    
Owner (Insiders is the omit-
ted category) 
     
Private   -0.032     
   (0.97)     
State   -0.001     
   (0.04)     
Foreign   0.092     
   (0.99)     
Other   -0.128     
   (3.16)***     
Regulation      -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
      (2.21)** (2.29)** (2.15)** 
Budget  support      0.070 0.076 0.082 
     (2.51)**  (2.71)***  (2.93)*** 
Federal Districts (Central is 
the omitted category) 
     
Northwest      0.018 
      ( 0 . 3 6 )  
South      0.070 
      ( 1 . 1 7 )  
V o l g a       - 0 . 0 1 5  
      ( 0 . 4 2 )  
Urals      0.066 
      ( 1 . 3 3 )  
Siberia      0.022 
      ( 0 . 5 1 )  
Far  East      0.167 
      (3.22)*** 
Infrasup    0.022    
    (0.72)    
Sales to state sector in 2000      0.003     
    (1.08)    
Sales to state sector in 2001      -0.007     
    (1.44)    
Sales to state sector in 2002      0.003     
    (1.14)    
Share of regional market       0.048     
    (0.81)    
Industry  dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations  313 270 313 313 313 
Pseudo  R2  0.63 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.67 
 Results reported in average marginal effects on Prob(heatsell=1) calculated using delta method by STATA's margeff after    
 probit, robust. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
 (4) The preferred model is derived from (3) by stepwise dropping the insignificant variables one at a time.  
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As expected, firm size is significant. The larger the firm, the more probable it is that it pro-
duces heat. Further, it is evident that the firm's size relative to the surrounding population 
matters. The larger the municipality, the less probable it is that an individual enterprise 
produces district heating. The variation between different industrial branches is surpris-
ingly small. Only the food processing industry differs somewhat from the general picture 
by having a larger probability of producing heat and a smaller probability of selling it out-
side. Even this variation is not statistically significant.
6 
Current ownership does not seem to be a decisive factor in determining a firm's 
probability of producing heat. Enterprises in which the state (whether federal, regional or 
local government) still is the largest shareholder are less likely to produce heating. The 
contrary is true for foreign-owned firms which seem to favour autarky at least when it 
comes to heating. This finding may be explained by the fact that foreign owners tend to 
favour self-sufficiency over possibly time-consuming negotiations with an outside pro-
vider. But the differences are statistically insignificant, most likely due to the fact that our 
sample includes only large firms. In practical terms all of them are former state-owned en-
terprises, mostly established during the Soviet period. The explanatory power of the own-
ership dummies is generally not very high and, disturbingly enough, their levels of signifi-
cance are not at all robust to choice of the omitted variable. Consequently, ownership 
dummies are not used in the subsequent analysis. This also helps to significantly increase 
the sample size.   
In explaining heat production, we therefore prefer to control for the size of the firm 
and of the locality as well as for the industry but not for the ownership structure of the 
firm. Also the dummy for having heating boilers in 1990 is naturally included. These four 
variables together explain a fair amount of the total variation as indicated by the high 
pseudo-R squared. The dummy on having housing in 1990 as well as the year in which the 
enterprise was founded (est.year) turned out to be insignificant in explaining the probabil-
ity of producing district heating.  
A wide range of additional variables characterising relations with the public sector 
were included in the regression. The only variables that really seem to make a difference 
are the dummy on receiving budget assistance and our measure of the regulatory burden. 
Heat-producing enterprises seem to face a slightly smaller regulatory burden than other 
firms, but the economic significance of this variable is extremely small. Nonetheless, heat 
                                                 
6 Visually the phenomenon may be seen in Figure A1 in Appendix 1. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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producers are, somewhat surprisingly, significantly more likely to receive budget assis-
tance from public funds. This would be natural if heat producers were very poor perform-
ers. But the result holds even if we control for the enterprise's profit level during the same 
period or during a longer period (1998-2002). One explanation is that the heat-producing 
enterprises are powerful in negotiating with the administration and they are therefore able 
to grab additional benefits from the local public sector. But the possibility of reverse cau-
sality (probability of receiving budget support being determined by whether a firm is a heat 
producer or not) cannot be ruled out.  
As the sample covers regions in all of the seven federal districts, we have the op-
portunity to test if geography affects the picture. The initial hypothesis was that enterprises 
located further North and East, i.e. in harsher climatic conditions, would be more likely to 
produce heating at least for themselves. This seems to be partly true; firms located in the 
Urals and Far Eastern federal districts are more likely to produce heating. The result, how-
ever, is likely to stem from the fact that we also control for inheritance, i.e. whether a firm 
had boilers in 1990. Firms situated in the Urals, Siberian and Far Eastern federal districts 
were less likely to have boilers in Soviet times. This may indicate that the average type of 
locality where a firm is situated differs between those districts and the European part of the 
country. Many Siberian industrial towns were, in fact, established only after WWII and 
they tended to be planned as an entity including specialised electricity and heat production 
companies (Hill and Gaddy 2002). One could, therefore, prefer to control for climatic con-
ditions directly by using a variable measuring the mean January temperature of the region. 
But this variable does suffer from a similar problem. Enterprises located in colder regions 
were less likely to have their own boilers in 1990.  
Also the variable measuring the quality of outside-provided infrastructure was sig-
nificant and had the expected sign, indicating that a firm which gives a better assessment of 
the quality of publicly provided infrastructure is less likely to produce heating. This vari-
able is, however, negatively correlated with the size of the locality and it is therefore not 
reported. Firms situated in bigger cities tend to rate the quality much better than the firms 
in smaller localities. It is therefore not surprising that including the infra_assessment vari-
able reduces the coefficient on the size of the locality, making it statistically significant 
only at the 15% level. Finally, a large set of additional variables characterising competitive 
pressures and the financial strength of the enterprises was included in the model, but these 
variables were not significant in any specification.  Laura Solanko   Coping with missing public infrastructure:   




4.2  Model specification and results for district heat provision  
 
When analysing the determinants of district heating provision, it should be remembered 
that we are examining the sub-sample of heat-producing enterprises. That is, large enter-
prises which tended to have boilers already during the Soviet period and which are nowa-
days likely to receive budget support in various forms. Therefore one could see an enter-
prise as facing three alternative choices: to not producing heat, producing heat only for it-
self or producing heat for both its own needs and those of outsiders. This setup leads to a 
multinominal model. A multinominal logit model using the explanatory variables found 
significant in individual logit models for heatprod and heatsell was estimated.
7 The esti-
mated model fails the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption (tested with 
a Hausman test as suggested by Hausman and McFadden 1984 and by the Small-Hsiao 
test), which is indeed a very strong assumption. Therefore an alternative formulation is 
needed. It would be tempting to move to a nested logit model as a two-level choice prob-
lem, where a firm first chooses between producing and not producing heat and then picks 
the final choice within that set. A nested logit model, however, assumes one has both firm 
and choice-specific data, which we do not have. One therefore needs to concentrate on 
treating the two discrete choices separately.   
It is possible to argue that some enterprises have chosen to not produce heating be-
cause they know they would not be able to sell it outside the plant. Ignoring the selection 
bias would lead to imprecise estimates and therefore it would be advisable to use the 
Heckman correction to correct for the possible bias. The practical problem we are faced 
with is, however, that due to the nature of the data we do not have a clear single selection 
variable. As both the selection and the main equation are in probit, even the functional 
form cannot be used as the selection criterion. We do argue, however, that the selection 
bias is likely to be extremely small if it exists at all, as the decision to produce or not to 
produce seems to be largely determined by inherited factors, as shown in the previous sec-
tion.  
The basic control variables are again found to have the expected signs, as reported 
in Table 5. Both the size of the enterprise and the population size of the municipality are 
significant in explaining the probability of providing district heating. The results concern-
                                                 
7 The results confirm the earlier findings about the importance of inherited factors, having boilers in 1990 
especially. See Appendix A2 for details. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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ing the ownership structure are unchanged from the analysis of heat production and are 
therefore not repeated here. Enterprises that provide district heating for outside users are 
significantly larger and situated in smaller municipalities than the other heat-producing en-
terprises. Further, the enterprises which had boilers or housing in 1990 are more likely to 
provide district heating 13 years later. For district heating provision, also the age of the en-
terprise seems to matter. Older firms are somewhat more likely to provide district heating 
for outside users.  
 
Table 5  Probit results for district heating provision 









 heatsell  heatsell  heatsell  heatsell 
Lnemployment 0.076  0.054  0.061  0.076 
 (1.81)*  (1.28)  (1.46)  (1.85)* 
Lnpopulation -0.055  -0.045  -0.048  -0.046 
 (3.03)***  (2.54)**  (2.60)***  (2.50)** 
Boilers90 0.388  0.355  0.385  0.376 
 (4.97)***  (3.92)***  (4.64)***  (4.60)*** 
Housing90 0.159  0.200  0.165  0.160 
 (1.69)*  (1.97)**  (1.74)*  (1.71)* 
Est.year -0.014  -0.010  -0.011  -0.014 
 (1.70)*  (1.97)**  (2.64)***  (2.18)** 
Divest   0.109  0.141  0.141 
   (1.45)  (1.90)*  (1.86)* 
Infra_assess   0.195  0.177  0.190 
   (2.52)**  (2.16)**  (2.33)** 
Regulation   0.005    0.008 
   (1.07)    (1.71)* 
Budget support    0.005     
   (0.08)     
Infrasupp   0.031     
   (0.56)     
Sales to state sector in 2000    -0.011     
   (1.04)     
Sales to state sector in 2001    0.019     
   (1.77)*     
Sales to state sector in 2002    -0.007     
   (1.05)     
Share of regional market    -0.065     
   (0.58)     
Relations   0.084  0.140   
   (1.09)  (1.84)*   
Industry dummies  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Observations 179  179  179  179 
Pseudo R2  0.31  0.37  0.35  0.35 
Results reported in average marginal effects on Prob(heatsell=1) calculated using delta method by STATA's margeff after probit, ro-
bust. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The preferred model, 
spec (3) and (4) are derived from (2) by stepwise dropping the insignificant variables one at a time.  
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Next, the set of variables characterising the public-private relationship is included 
(second column in Table 5). In addition to the variables used earlier, we have at our dis-
posal two potentially interesting indicator variables. Divest-dummy takes the value of one 
if the general manager said the enterprise would like to get rid of their heating boilers. The 
other dummy variable, Relations, takes the value of one if the general manager thinks their 
relations with the local administration would worsen if they sold their boilers to a third 
party. Once again the insignificant variables are removed from the model one at the time in 
order to arrive at the preferred model. Unfortunately, the relations dummy is correlated 
with the regulation variable and including the former always makes the latter insignificant. 
Therefore, in the final stage, we are unable to include them both in the same specification.    
The high significance level of the divest-variable suggests that delivering district 
heating is not a fortune. The probability of being a heat seller increases by 10-15% if a firm 
would like to get rid of its boilers. Here one is inclined to believe that the result is indeed 
driven by reverse causality. Being a district-heating provider may increase the possibility 
of wishing to divest the boilers. Either way, the relation between the wish to divest and dis-
trict heating provision is interesting. It seems to confirm our hypothesis that heat provision 
is not a profitable line of business that the enterprises would like to maintain. 
The effect of the assessment on local infrastructure quality (infra_assess) is signifi-
cant and fairly large. The enterprises that rate the quality as being poor have a 20% higher 
probability of delivering district heating than enterprises rating the quality as satisfactory. 
We may thus conclude that where the local infrastructure is of poor quality, the enterprises 
are bound to engage in providing some parts of it by themselves. Due to the lack of suit-
able instruments, we cannot, however, rule out the possibility of the result being driven by 
reverse causality.
8 
The relations dummy has a positive effect on the probability of being a heat pro-
vider. Here the interpretation is fairly clear. If an enterprise not engaged in district heat 
provision were to divest its boilers, the relations with local administration would not 
change. Whereas if an enterprise engaged in this type of infrastructure provision were to 
divest or sell its boilers, the local administration would likely oppose it. In most cases there 
is no alternative district heating provider available. This means that anyone in possession 
of the boilers is, at least temporarily, a monopoly provider for the surrounding districts. 
                                                 
8 The firms selling district heating to outside users are simply more engaged in infrastructure issues and con-
sequently the quality of infrastructure matters for them. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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The local administration has presumably created a mutually beneficial relationship with the 
current monopolist. Even if the enterprise engaged in infrastructure provision would like to 
get rid of this function, it may not be willing to do that for fear of worsening relations with 
the local administration.  
Heat-producing enterprises seem to face a somewhat higher regulatory burden. The 
effect of regulation is positive and statistically significant. The economic significance, 
however, is minor. An increase of 10 days spent with various regulative agencies by the 
general manager would increase the probability of providing district heating by 0.01%. 
Here one should note that the time spent by the general manager with regulative agencies 
is not necessarily a burden for the firm at large. Time spent with local agencies may also be 
one of the main tasks of management and bring considerable financial benefits for the en-
terprise. What the regulation variable indeed tells us is that the manager in enterprises pro-
viding district heating has more contacts with the local agencies entitled to regulate and 
licence their line of business.     
Analogous to the preceding subsection, a large set of additional variables character-
ising the business environment and competition was added. None of these turned out to be 
significant in explaining district heat provision.    
 
 
4.3  Robustness and some additional results 
 
The results presented in this section are therefore robust for the inclusion of a large set of 
additional variables as described in the previous subsections. The existence of endogeneity 
of the variables characterising the relations with the public sector was tested using the in-
dustry means as instruments. The Rivers-Vuong (1988) two-step procedure does not reject 
the null hypothesis of the dummy on divest being exogenous. Similar tests were run for the 
regulation, divest and relations variables in the heat provision equations. Based on the test 
results, exogeneity cannot be rejected.
9 Further, all of the interesting variables do cause 
some degree of concern for reverse causality. As there is no way to exclude the possibility 
of reverse causality, we prefer to speak about the connection between heat deliveries and 
the variables characterising relations with the public sector-- not about causality. 
                                                 
9 Details on endogeneity testing are provided in Appendix 2. Laura Solanko   Coping with missing public infrastructure:   
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The preceding analysis revealed that the decisions to produce and sell heating are 
largely determined by inherited factors. In addition, heat-producing firms are, on average, 
more likely to receive budget assistance. Firms selling heat to outside users, on average, 
face a heavier regulatory burden and more often would like to get rid of their boilers. Do 
the firms engaged in district heating provision suffer in terms of sales, growth or invest-
ments?  
We have data on sales, labour productivity and profits for the five-year period 
1998-2002 for most but by no means all of the enterprises in our sample. On average, it 
seems that heat-producing enterprises are characterised by higher sales, higher investments 
and higher profits per employee than non-heat-producing ones. Among the heat-producing 
enterprises, those providing district heating for outside users have, on average, somewhat 
lower sales, lower investments and lower profits per employee. These differences are, 
however, fairly small and usually not statistically significant. Only sales per employee turn 
out to be statistically significant in explaining heat provision, but their economic signifi-
cance is close to zero.
10 One is therefore inclined to draw the conclusion that enterprises 
providing district heating are able to cover the costs associated with heat production and 
delivery either directly from their consumers or indirectly via closer ties with the local pub-
lic sector.  
The survey provides us with interesting additional information about the engage-
ment of large enterprises in infrastructure provision. In addition to providing district heat-
ing, enterprises give voluntary support to many other types of public infrastructure such as 
road construction and maintenance. One can reasonably assume that the decisions on heat 
provision and infrastructure support are made simultaneously and therefore a seemingly 
unrelated bivariate probit model was used. Surprisingly enough, the results suggest that 
these two issues are not determined simultaneously. The available data is not very helpful 
in analysing the determinants of support for public infrastructure. What we can say, based 
on the results reported in Appendix 4, is that large firms are no more likely to support pub-
lic infrastructure but firms located in smaller municipalities certainly are.   
Finally, we split the sample of heat-sellers into two groups according to whether the 
general manager estimates heat deliveries as being profitable or not. At the descriptive 
level, the only notable differences between these two types of heat providers are found in 
firm size as well as in the size of the locality. Only the size of the locality remains signifi-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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cant in the simple probit model reported in Table 6. Enterprises situated in large cities are 
significantly more likely to provide district heating profitably. This result may be caused 
either by firms situated in large cities being better negotiators or by the fact that generally 
smaller cities are simply poorer and more cash-constrained. We do, however, have some 
indication that ownership matters in being profitable. Insider-owned firms are less likely to 
consider heat provision to be profitable and especially in comparison to state-owned enter-
prises, the difference is statistically significant. 
 
Table 6   Probit results for probability of being a profitable heat distributor  
  (1) Baseline  (2) Ownership  
Lnemployment -0.004  -0.014 
 (0.08)  (0.29) 
Lnpopulation 0.076  0.072 
 (3.06)***  (2.94)*** 
Boilers90 -0.008   
 (0.05)   
Housing90 0.128   
 (0.95)   
Infra_assess -0.169   
 (1.63)   
Divest -0.152   
 (1.67)*   
Industry dummies  Included  Included 
Ownership (Insiders is the 
omitted category) 
  
Private   0.109 
   (1.23) 
State   0.303 
   (2.35)** 
Foreign   0.248 
   (1.42) 
Other   0.357 
   (2.31)** 
Observations 141  141 
Pseudo R2  0.11  0.12 
Results reported in average marginal effects on Prob(heatsell=1) calculated using delta method by STATA's margeff 
after probit, robust. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
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5   Conclusions 
 
In this paper heat production and district heat provision by Russian industrial enterprises 
was analysed based on new survey evidence. First, three quarters of the surveyed enter-
prises produce heating in one way or another. Of those, over half produce heat in such 
magnitudes that they are able to provide heating also for users outside their plant area. As 
only less than 40% of the enterprise managers stated that heat deliveries bring any profit, it 
seems natural to wish to enquire more deeply into the determinants of those activities.  
Compared to the firms relying solely on municipal district heating, heat-producing 
firms are, on average, larger, situated in smaller municipalities and had boilers and housing 
in Soviet times. Further, compared to other heat-producing firms, also firms providing dis-
trict heating are, on average, larger, situated in smaller municipalities and had housing in 
Soviet times. These inherited factors do explain a great deal in the variation of heat produc-
tion. District heating, however, is not the main business of any of the surveyed firms and 
only a few consider it to be profitable. Therefore it seems fair to conclude that most heat 
producers are sort of locked into the situation. Due to historical reasons, public district 
heating is occasionally missing and some enterprises are burdened with the obligation to 
provide heating not only for their own use but also for the surrounding community. Thus, 
one would suppose that heat production and provision comprise an additional financial 
burden for an enterprise. Our data, does not, however, support that view. In terms of pro-
ductivity or productivity growth, there is no statistically significant difference between heat 
producers, heat sellers and other firms.  
Therefore one is inclined to believe that heat producers are, on average, better 
placed to negotiate for benefits in some other areas. There is, indeed, robust evidence on 
heat producers being more likely to receive budget assistance. This result remains even if 
we control for profits or sales per employee. Thus, we may conclude that heat producers 
are successful in negotiating for direct or indirect financial aid in the form of budget assis-
tance to – possibly – cover the costs of heat production. The survey data reveals that firms 
providing district heating are on average more likely to face a high regulatory burden. The 
reason may be that the enterprises have adapted to the institutional requirements by build-
ing up good relations with the local administration. Many a firm engaged in district heating 
provision would like to get rid of their heat-generating capacity, but they are locked into 
the status quo for fear of losing the valuable relations. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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In short, the enterprises producing and providing heating are more likely to have 
close ties with the local public sector. These enterprises both receive benefits in the form of 
increased budget assistance or better connections with local administration and face addi-
tional costs in the form of contributions to public infrastructure. If district heat provision is 
an additional burden for an enterprise, the results show that the enterprises have found their 
own ways to accommodate the costs. The performance of the enterprises engaged in heat 
deliveries and production, as measured by sales and productivity, is no worse than that of 
the other firms. The results indicate that close ties with the local administration may be 
used to compensate for the direct costs of heat delivery.  
This result does not necessarily mean good news for reforming, repairing and up-
dating Russian municipal infrastructure. The results indicate that infrastructure provision 
by large enterprises has created a situation where enterprises have a continued interest in 
maintaining close connections with the local public sector. As Russian municipalities gen-
erally lack resources for infrastructure investments, it is most probably in their interest to 
ensure that the enterprises continue to be engaged in infrastructure provision. This un-
avoidably leads to an equilibrium that no party has a direct interest in departing from. The 
economic playing field therefore will remain tilted in favour of large, incumbent firms. 
New entrepreneurs or small and medium-sized enterprises will have a hard time in compet-
ing with the infrastructure-providing incumbents.  
This raises an interesting policy question: should the central government wish to 
break the status quo, what could be its options? The situation could be analysed as an out-
come of a lobbying game, where ailing firms lobby self-interested local politicians by pro-
viding public infrastructure, see Solanko (2003). In order to break the status quo, the cen-
tral government would need to ensure that entry costs to the sectors dominated by large 
incumbents are minimised. Another possibly fruitful path could be to give the local politi-
cians a greater direct interest in small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) development. 
The differences between Russia and China indicate that linking regional tax revenues to 
the success of new enterprises can create powerful incentives for favouring those firms 
(Gordon-Li 1997). The emergence of a new SME sector as an important regional revenue 
source could greatly level the economic playing field. 
 Laura Solanko   Coping with missing public infrastructure:   
An analysis of Russian industrial enterprises   
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Appendices 
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  11 Power & fuel    
  12 Metallurgy    
  13 Chemical industries    
  14 Machinery    
  15 Forestry, paper & pulp   
  16 Construction materials     
  17 Light industries     
  18 Food industries    
  19 Other    
  
 
Appendix 2 MLOGIT 
Table A2.1 Multinominal logit on heat production choices.  
  Prod_choice=1 (no 
heat production) is the comparison 
group 
Prod_choice2 
(heatprod, no heatsell)  Prod_choice3  
(heatsell) 
Boilers90 5.922**  7.961** 
Housing90 0.154  0.909 
Lnemployment 0.688*  0.809* 
Lnpopulation -0.090  -0.458* 
Budget support  1.382**  1.506* 
Infra_assess 1.577*  2.023** 
Regulation -0.125*  -0.068 
Industry dummies  Included  Included 
Observations 331   
Pseudo R2  0.49   
    Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Hausman tests of IIA assumption 
P>Chi2 
Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption 
P>Chi2 
2 1.000  0.000 
3 0.598  0.000 
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. 
 
   
Appendix 3 On Rivers-Vuong testing 
Endogeneity, however, may pose serious problems. As an example, one can imagine there 
exists a variable unknown to us, like managerial ability, that affects both the amount of 
regulation a firm faces and a firm's decision to provide district heating. Or it is also possi-
ble that the probability of wishing to divest the heating boilers and a firm's decision to pro-
vide heating are in fact determined simultaneously. To test endogeneity, we need to have in 
mind an alternative model for the suspected endogenous variable including at least one ex-
ogenous variable (instrumental variable) correlated with the suspected variable but uncor-
related with the dependent variable. The problem is that the survey data does not provide 
us with plenty of alternatives for reliable instruments. We will instrument the suspected 
variables by the industry means. The industry mean certainly is correlated with the indi-
vidual variable, but any single firm is unlikely to have any (much) influence on the mean. 
Since we have only one possible instrument for every endogenous variable, overidentifica-
tion is not an issue. To test for endogeneity, we use the Rivers-Vuong (1988) two-step pro-
cedure as defined in Wooldridge (2002).  
 
Assume the model is  
1) y1 = b1x1 + ay2 + u1,  y1=1 if y1*>0, 0 otherwise 
2) y2 = b1x21 + b2x22 + u2 = bx2 + u2 
3) Var u1 = Var u2 = 1 
 
Then the Rivers-Vuong (1988) two-step procedure is a) Run linear OLS regression on the 
endogenous variable y2 explained by the instrumental variable and the exogenous vari-
ables b1 and save the residuals û2 and b) Run probit y1 on the exogenous variables b1, on 
y2 and on the residual term û2 to get consistent estimators of the scaled coefficients. The 
usual t-statistic on û2 is a valid test of the null hypothesis of y2 being exogenous. Laura Solanko   Coping with missing public infrastructure:   
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The two-step procedure suggests that the budget support-dummy in the probit re-
gression on heat production is, indeed, exogenous. The estimated scaled coefficient of the 
residual term is insignificant and therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Further, 
when compared to probit estimation without the residual term, the estimated scaled coeffi-
cients of the other variables are largely unchanged but somewhat smaller. This is additional 
evidence for the null hypothesis. Assuming that the instruments themselves are exogenous 
(and that y2 and u2 are not correlated or that the residuals u2 are normally distributed), we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of the dummy being exogenous.  
The exogeneity of the regulation, divest and relations variables in the probit models 
for heatsell (Table 5 in the text) were tested similarly. The residuals were insignificant and 
consequently we feel that the assumption of exogeneity may reasonably be retained.  
 
Appendix 4 On sales, profits, investments and heat provision 
Table A4.1 Financial variables and heat production and district heating provision 
Heatprod             
    0 1 P>t  N.obs 
Mean of sales per employee in 2002, ths rbls  344.8  370.8  0.72  355 
Mean of profits per employee in 2002, 000[?] rbls  25.7  31.2  0.50  344 
Mean of investments per employee in 2002, rbls  16.2  25.6  0.29  340 
              
Heatsell             
    0 1 P>t  N.obs 
Mean of sales per employee in 2002, [ths?] rbls  461.2  306.9  0.07  264 
Mean of profits per employee in 2002, rbls  40.4  24.9  0.19  260 
Mean of investments per employee in 2002, rbls  40.2  15.3  0.2  251 
Note: P-value refers to t-test on equality of means corrected for unequal variances 
 
Table A4.2 Probit results for district heating provision  
 
 Spec(1)  Spec(2)  Spec(3) 
Lnemployment 0.101** 0.087*  0.071 
Lnpopulation -0.059*** -0.054** -0.057*** 
Boilers90 0.337***  0.295*** 0.276*** 
Housing90 0.154  0.163*  0.136 
Sales per employee  -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000** 
Infra_assess   0.223***   
Regulation   0.009   
Divest   0.191**  0.164** 
Relations     0.245*** 
Industry dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Observations 169  169  169 
Pseudo R2  0.27  0.32  0.32 
Results reported in average marginal effects on Prob(heatsell=1) calculated using delta method by STATA's margeff 
after probit, robust.. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%       BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Appendix 5 District heating provision and voluntary support for public infrastructure 
 
Table A5.1 Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit results 
 Heatsell  Infrasupport 
Lnemployment 0.369  -0.028 
 (2.59)***  (0.25) 
Lnpopulation -0.196  -0.165 
 (3.05)***  (2.97)*** 
Boilers90 1.298  -0.132 
 (4.96)***  (0.60) 
Housing90 0.485   
 (1.86)*   
Infra_assess 0.582  0.386 
 (2.11)**  (1.77)* 
Regulation 0.048  0.024 
 (2.85)***  (1.56) 
Divest 0.595  
 (1.99)**   
 (0.52)  (0.17) 
Industry dummies  Included  Included 
Constant -4.562  0.286 
 (3.37)***  (0.24) 
    
Observations 249  249 
Rho  0 .23  (0.116)   
  Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of Rho=0 at 10% level. Robust z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; **   
  significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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